The ineffable now in physics by Merriam, Paul
The ineffable now in physics
Abstract While physicists know how to use quantum mechanics, there is no consensus on what 
quantum mechanics is a mechanics of. The aim of this paper is to introduce the beginning of what 
might turn out to be an interpretation of quantum mechanics—one that leaves all calculated 
probabilities intact. The basic idea is that quantum mechanics describes the objective world, but there 
must be added to it ineffable variables, one of which is the temporal 'now'. Ineffable variables are not 
'hidden variables'. 
1. Basic Idea  There is no consensus on what quantum mechanics means. Evidently, to get a meaning, 
either something must be added to it or something must be subtracted from it (or both). We take the 
former option. To standard quantum mechanics we will add ineffable parameters. An 'effable' parameter
is one for which different systems agree exists and agree is capable of taking on a system-independent 
value. Examples include position, momentum, energy level, and spin. An 'ineffable' parameter is one 
which a system may use in describing its own state, but which is not part of the description of the state 
as given by another system.
There are extremely good reasons to think (section 2) that a complete description of a system 
must include ineffable variables. In this paper we will be mostly concerned with one particular 
ineffable variable, that aspect of time that is described by the 'now'. A simple case works like this. Alice
describes her own (quantum) state with parameters xA, tA, and nowA. The effable parameters are xA, and 
tA. The ineffable parameter is nowA. Thus, Bob will describe Alice's state using only the parameters xA, 
and tA. For Bob, there is no such variable as nowA. Conversely, Bob will describe his own state with 
parameters xB, tB, and nowB. Alice will describe Bob's state only with the varibales xB, and tB, there 
being no such variable, according to her, as nowB. That is the basic idea.
2. Panpsychism  I am conscious, I have subjective experience, and this is certain to a degree even 
greater than the certainty that there are physical laws. There is in some sense nothing special about my 
composition—I'm made of electrons and quarks etc. Thus there is good reason to think that the basic 
elements that make up my brain are accompanied by the basic elements of subjective experience—
qualia. One is lead to the conclusion that an electron is accompanied by a quale—a subjective 
experience—for example, the color green. Perhaps a positron is accompanied by a blue quale. There is 
an enormous amount that has been written about this idea but the basic idea is clear enough and is 
called (Dualist) Panpsychism. [1]
     Now, I cannot communicate to you what my subjective experiences are. I can demonstrate to 
you 1 meter of distance, but not my experience of green. So these qualia are said to be 'ineffable'. The 
physical aspect of a system may be described by effable parameters x1, x2, … But the complete 
description of a system must also include ineffable parameters y1, y2, … A complete description is given
by both kinds of variables, x1, x2, …, y1, y2, …
3. Time  Famously, McTaggart [2] identified two different notions of time. There is the A-series, in 
which an event is future, then present (i.e. now), then past. And there is the B-series, in which events 
are either before or after each other. The values of the A-series change whereas the values (order) of the
B-series are permanent. 
A complete description of a system must incorporate both series. How is this to be done? The B-
series is what physicists normally use: all systems agree that a time of 1 sec. on a watch comes before a
time of 2 sec. on the watch, etc. General relativity preserves the order of events on a time-like 
worldline. The idea will be to incorporate the A-series as a different ineffable variable now for each 
system.
4. Simultaneity  It's worth looking at this in the context of the relativity of simultaneity. Suppose Alice 
remains at the Milky Way galaxy, and that Bob rockets off to the Andromeda galaxy, turns around when
he gets there, and comes back to the Milky Way. Also suppose that Charlie is at a galaxy off the Milky 
Way-Andromeda route. For some configurations, a state of Charlie will be in the past (future) of Bob 
and when Bob turns around Charlie's state will then be in the future (past) of Bob. It is said that the 
plane of simultaneity of Bob has changed. So far so good. 
However, “But (bringing the subject into the story) my Now advances along my trajectory at
one second of my personal experience for each second that passes on my watch, which
follows the same trajectory as I do. And your Now advances along your trajectory at
one second of your personal experience for each second that passes on your watch, which
follows the same trajectory as you do.” [3], p. 33. But we don't need to go the the extremes of QBism to
use this. Alice's now advances along her worldline at a rate of one second of personal experience for 
each second that passes on her watch. Also, Bob's now advances along his worldline at a rate of one 
second of personal experience for each second that passes on his watch. In addition, Charlie's now 
advances along his worldline at a rate of one second of personal experience for each second that passes 
on his watch.  
The now is empirically known to be a feature of all systems and can't be ignored just because 
it's inconvenient. Happily, the situation can be resolved. Alice, Bob, and Charlie may all agree on the 
order of their watch's ticks along each person's worldline—this is the B-series information. This 
information is effable. Yet Alice, Bob, and Charlie may experience their own senses of now—this is the 
A-series information. This information is ineffable. For example, Bob's description of Charlie includes 
the order of ticks on Charlie's watch, but does not include Charlie's now. Otherwise, Charlie's now 
would be all over the place (temporally speaking), in contradiction to the empirical facts.  
5. Double slit  This furnishes us with an interpretation of the double slit experiment. Suppose that, in 
laboratory time, an electron is fired from a gun at t = 0 seconds and lands on the screen at laboratory 
time t = 10, at which time the experimenter in the laboratory checks the screen to see where the 
electron has landed. It's quite obvious that from t = 0 through t = 10 the experimenter experienced a 
now, I'll call nowL, that informed him of the watch-time at which he was actually existing. 
For the experimenter, the electron also went from watch-time t = 0 to t = 10 (assuming non-
relativistic speeds). But for the experimenter, there is no variable nowe indicating where in its A-series 
these electron events were. So at some laboratory time, say, t = 8, nowe may have been, for example, at 
watch-time t = 2 or watch-time t = 5... nowe does not have to be at the same watch-time as nowL. 
Nevertheless, for the electron nowe is a parameter and events advance normally through its A-series, 
though for the electron nowL is not a parameter of the laboratory. 
This strategy can be employed in interpreting the delayed-choice quantum eraser.
6. Path integrals  For the transition kernel K one has
Notice there are two different notions of time. There is the laboratory time going from 0 to T, and there 
is the time t in the action of the system under study. These times don't have to be equal because t ranges
over B-series information only.
7. Ontological Models  The Ontological Models framework makes many things in realist 
interpretations precise and allows for rigorous theorems. To prove the PBR theorem (that quantum 
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mechanics is psi-ontic) it is assumed that “the ontic state space of a composite system should be a 
Cartesian product of the ontic state spaces of the subsystems”, [4] p. 104. The generalization to the 
ontic state space of two subsystems each with ineffable parameters is more complicated.
 For example suppose Bob may parameterize Alice's ontic state space with the effable time 
variable 0 ≤ t ≤ 10 = OA (informal notation). Then, according to Alice, her ontic state space is 
parameterized by an ontologically privileged time nowA together with the states parameterized by t. The
nowA take on each t value at some point, so she gives her ontic state space as (isomorphic to) the 
Cartesian product of OA with OA. Similarly for Bob. It might then be that the ontic state space of the 
Alice-Bob composite system is the Cartesian product of OA with OA with OB with OB. But there are 
subtle issues here whose discussion unfortunately lies outside the bounds of this paper.
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